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Article 5

NURNBERG 1946-THE TRIAL
In January, 1947, the Notre Dame Lawyer published the first English translation of "The Significance of the Nurnberg Trials for Germany and the World," by the German philosopher Karl Jaspers. With
the permission of the editor of La Vie Intellectuelle we publish here a
French view of the trials by Paul Reuter.'-Editor.

During the war, the Allies had been led to an increasingly
precise and concurring position on the procedures which
they intended to use against German war criminals after the
victory. Several solemn declarations followed one another:
those on January 12, 1942, December 12, 1942 (issued simultaneously in London, Washington, and Moscow), and the
Moscow Declaration of October 30, 1943. From October
20, 1943 athe United Nations Commission on War Crimes, an
organization for research and information combining the
western Allies, functioned in London. The Potsdam Agreement of 1945 laid down the general principles of trial; the
war criminals were to be tried according to the law and by
the courts of each accusing country. For the major criminals, whose crimes could not be geographically localized, an
international military tribunal was to be formed.
The London Agreement of August 8, 1945 carried out this
directive by establishing the tribunal; to the four great nations were to be added twenty other powers who could take
part in the deliberations which made up the international
public organization.
Not without difficulty, the Allies succeeded in agreeing
on a list of twenty-four names, and Nilrnberg was selected
as the seat of the tribunal. The charges were issued jointly
in Berlin, October 18, 1945; the trial opened on November
20, 1945, and closed on October 1, 1946, after four hundred
four sessions. The Inter-allied Control Council of Berlin
carried out the sentences, particularly the executions.
1 Reuter, Nurermberg 1946-Le Proces, (France; 1946) La Vie Intellectuee,
December, 1946.
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The first trial may be followed by a number of similar
trials, providing the Allies agree on the criminals to be called
before the tribunal. For political reasons it seems likely that
these other trials, particularly of the German industrialists
and of Schacht, acquitted by the Niirnberg court, will be
heard before courts established in each zone of occupation
by its occupying authority.
But this first trial, unique of its kind, is in itself an important event. Students of history and of law will delve
not only into the monumental opinion (published in extenso
in a voluminous pamphlet by the Journal officiel) but also
into the hundreds of thousands of documents, speeches by
prosecution and defense, evidence of all sorts, whose quantity
presents difficult problems of classification and preservation.
But this affair is not the property of technicians alone. It
touches all those who have lived through the tense years; it
will probably weigh heavily, for good or for evil, on all who
are destined to witness the days to come, days which will,
alas, be no less tragic, according to all indications.
How Is This Trial To Be Judged?
What point of view should one take in order to give to
this trial its exact significance?
That is indeed the key question which determines both
the critical evaluation and the choice of facts and essential
elements which one plans to stress.
Should one evoke the memory of the deaths and infinite
suffering of five years of misery? Should one take the impossible wager of examining consciences and of guessing the
judgment of God? Should one examine in the light of the
opinion the requirements of human legal institutions and the
real developments in international law? Should one measure
the political effects of such an affair?
It is our own opinion that the first two questions ought not
hold our attention for long; but it is highly important not to

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

confuse these four methods, which are those of human emotions, of divine justice, of law and of politics.
We will be pardoned for insisting in this article on these
points which seem self-evident. But the trial has been interpreted by a press which with rare exceptions, has displayed
the sorry limitations of a more than ordinary mediocrity.
During ten long months of proceedings public interest waned,
and in a trial which owed it to itself to be sensational the
lengthy examinations and cross-examinations, made according to Anglo-Saxon trial procedure, often obscured the
main question and led to dullness which discouraged the
average public. Thus it happened that fateful incidents and
moments passed unnoticed or nearly so. So it was that the
French press failed to seize upon the matter of the secret
protocol in the Russo-German Pact of 1939 which almost
upset the very existence of the tribunal. Then when the
verdict was announced acquitting Papen, Schacht and
Fritsche and failing to condemn the Supreme Command and
the S. A., the press let itself go over the scandal and gave
free rein to a passion which recalled the recent years when
one of the future victors declared, "The only good Germans
are dead ones." It is evident that on the ground of retaliation there was no reason for any acquittal; that was moreover the feeling of Goering himself who had little love for
judicial procedure. In fact he let it be understood in the
course of the trial that he did not understand why they were
making so much ceremony about putting him to death.
The solution consisting of executing criminals after having
simply identified them definitely (obligation cleared after
having exposed the corpse to public view) would have presented a technical difficulty because in accordance with the
retaliation principle several millions of Germans would have
had to be massacred.
Enough irony: it is unbecoming. It will always be to the
credit of the Allies that they judged the authors of the wellknown and monstrous crimes, that they did so according to
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traditional rules, public argument and cross-examination,
free defense, etc. This judicial procedure clearly carries with
it a major result: the possibility of an acquittal. Many of
our contemporaries are unaware of this fundamental rule of
legal trials. If one wishes-and it can be one-to discuss
an acquittal, one must place himself on the same ground on
which the judge is placed, on legal ground.
In an entirely opposite sense, we can not examine the
judgment of God. Only two of the accused, Fxanck and von
Schirach, the first condemned to death and executed, the
second punished with twenty years at hard labor, only these
two showed any repentance and were converted after the
collapse of Naziism. The others more or less clearly pleaded
not guilty. A basic corruption of conscience, which does
not preclude complete good faith, was apparent in many of
the replies and statements; aberrations as radical as Naziism
poison body and soul and destroy the very foundations of
morality. The arguments bore striking testimony to this
fact. That does not authorize us to reckon the divine judgment.
The Essential Questions
Finally two questions remain essential, and concerning
them we should like to offer a few brief remarks. First of
all: what are the characteristics of the Niirnberg verdict
from a judicial point of view? It is on this basis, where it
was placed, that this affair must be examined. Second: what
are the effects of this verdict on the future of peace? In
reality, every legal punishment follows complex goals. This
is true even of the correction of the least infraction of civil
law. Faced with such great crimes the attainment of these
goals assumes an exceptional importance; the return of those
horrors must be prevented and peace must be assured. The
punishment must then produce a healthy fear in the public
mind; it must also-and this is the attitude of modem penal
law-bring about an improvement in the guilty one, cure
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him of his vicious tendencies. It will be proper to fit the
Niirnberg verdict into the framework of international politics, particularly where they concern peace and the treatment of Germany, and to consider it in the light of German
opinions.

I. THE JUDICIAL ASPECTS OF THE NURNBERG DECISION
This is the first time in history that an international penal
tribunal has functioned, since the attempt to judge the war
criminals of 1914-1918, as prescribed in Articles 227 and
following of the Versailles Treaty, remained a dead letter.
The originality of this body explains the objections raised
against it.
A Truly InternationalTribunal
The tribunal would not be a truly international tribunal
in the technical sense of the word. This purely legal objection often is expressed in a simpler form: the Niirnberg
court would not offer the guarantees of an authentically international tribunal. No one dared condemn the cumbersome but impartial procedure of cross-examination or a defense conducted by German lawyers several of whom were
notorious Nazis. But the composition of the court was attacked: four main judges and four supplementary judges
named by the original signatories. Would it not have been
more equitable to entrust the judgment of the accused to a
tribunal composed of a majority of neutrals?
To that, one must answer in the affirmative. It would
have been preferable, for example, to establish a penal court
near the International Court of Justice at the Hague. This
institution, in danger of dying of starvation like its predecessor, would thus have been reinforced and the force of the
verdict would doubtless have been strengthened, particularly
in German eyes. But, according to the legal arrangements,
it is certain that each of the Allies could try a German war
criminal, after seizing him, before its national courts. Con-
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sequently, there was no mistake in turning the accused over
to the military tribunal at Niirnberg. But one must go
further. This court is something different and bigger than
a joint tribunal of the four great powers more or less cloaked
in the guise of an inter:allied organization for Germany. In
reality the sentence was given in the name of the following
countries which adhered to the London treaty: Greece, Denmark, Jugoslavia, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium,
Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, India, Venezuela, Uruguay, and
Paraguay. If this list does not include all civilized nations,
it establishes the incontestably international character of the
institution.
An Independent Tribunal
As for the way in which the tribunal was able to defend
and maintain its independence, to assume the prominent and
difficult role which was given to it, to act, in a word, as an
international body, one can only express a favorable general
opinion. The effect produced on the German lawyers on
the reading of the verdict was noticed by all spectators, and
one of the lawyers later declared: "In so far as a human
sentence can be called just, this one is." The court forbade
debate on only two questions, that of the fairness of. the
Treaty of Versailles and that of Russia's conduct in the war
since 1939. As a matter of fact the German lawyers had
often tried to extend already endless discussions by introducing points borrowed from these two subjects, entirely foreign to the problems in question, at least judicially.
In matters of evidence the court showed a meticulousness
which some may think extreme. No aspect of the vast problem submitted to it was neglected. It realized fully the anarchistic and arbitrary nature of the general trial of war
crimes and Naziism, and it did not hesitate, following typically international precedents, to issue to the governments
recommendations which one must applaud.
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The verdict, though firm and clear, is quite varied; a remarkable effort at analysis and discrimination of responsibilities was applied to each defendant. Thus the guilt of
Admiral Doenitz involved all rules of naval warfare. The
court, half of whose judges were Anglo-Saxons, did not hesitate to censure the orders of the British Admiralty and the
procedure of the American Navy. It is in fact because of
the Allied tactics that the court refused to condemn in its
entirety the German submarine campaign.
The Legal Rules Applied
It is in a study of the legal fules applied by the tribunal
that its role appears in a clear light.
The agreement of August 8, 1945, and its amendments,
following a procedure justified often by the very uncertainty
of international law, specified the rules according to which
the court was to adjudicate. Fundamentally it foresaw the
following charges (Art. 6 of the Statute):
(a) Crimes against peace: that is to say the direction,
preparation, launching or pursuit of a war of aggression or
of a war in violation of international treaties, guarantees, or
agreements, or participation in a concerted plan or plot for
the accomplishment of any of the preceding acts.
(b) War crimes: that is to say violations of rules and
customs of warfare. These violations include, but are not
limited to murder, inhumane treatment of or deportation for
forced labor or any other purpose of civilian populations in
occupied -territory; murder or inhumane treatment of prisoners
of war or persons taken at sea; the execution of hostages, the
pillage of public or private possessions; needless destruction of
cities and villages or devastation not justified by military requirements.
(c) Crimes against humanity: that is to say murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or any other inhumane
act against all civilian populations before or during the war;
or also persecution for religious or racial or political reasons
committed in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the international tribunal or attached thereto, whether or
not these persecutions constituted a violation of the internal
laws of the country in which they were perpetrated.
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Their Application
Guided by these provisions (completed by a few others)
the tribunal had two paths open before it: either to apply
them as simply as possible without going outside the founding charter of the court, or to interpret them freely, to place
them in the evolutionary development of international law,
to indicate their bases as well as their precise meaning. The
first solution, the simpler one, exposed the flank to a serious
attack on principles. The defense did not fail to develop the
attack. The accused were to be judged according to principles arbitrarily established in August, 1945, for crimes
which did not exist as such at the time the deeds were committed. This would be a perfect appeal for arbitration and
the violation of a principle which has always been imposed
on lawmakers, at least morally: the non-retroactive nature of
penal laws, nulla crimen sine lege. They could argue in this
manner.
The court chose the second solution, which obviates these
objections, and endeavored to prove that the provisions of
the code were only a statement of the universal international
law in force before hostilities. The results of this stand are
of prime importance. The code no longer appears as an
arbitrary act of the conquerors; general principles are formulated which permit both restricted and extensive interpretation. In return the court's task becomes more difficult and
also in a way more lofty. It is in reality obliged to define its
conception of general international law and by the same
token to indicate its bases.
That is what it did with a precision which makes its decision one of history's most important judicial documents.
Law Above the State
It had to choose between two fundamental theories of international law. One of them, which has in fact prevailed in
many countries, notably modern Germany, based law solely
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on the will of the state, the only "person" recognized by international law. A state is bound only by the treaties which
it has signed and ratified. Custom drops into the background; to satisfy logic it was defined as a tacit treaty binding only those states which gave unquestionable signs of
recognizing it. The state moreover covers all activities: at
the top, the men who make decisions in its name cannot
be held personally responsible, they are protected by the immunity of heads of states; at the base, citizens and workers
are forced by the theory of passive obedience to bow to the
modern Leviathan. The idolatry built on these judicial
maxims is clearly seen: it is the cult of the state, the only
law, the only goal, the only being. This is the modern form
of paganism.
Opposed to this, radically different theories are defined.
First of all, the doctrine of natural law. This doctrine
reached its greatest force in the writings of Francisco de
Vitoria (1480-1546), the culmination of a long series of
canonical and scholastic works. He bases international law
on the intelligent and free nature of individuals so naturally
inclined to social relations that they form for him a fundamental law, that of relationships inter gentes. Another
school, very different in its origins but not in its conclusions,
is sustained by the French sociological group. Denying the
personality of the. state, it sees the source of law in a condition entirely constant in the social group; the individual has
the right to extend his social life indefinitely and participates
freely in all the international groups he pleases. The only
subject of law, he is sovereignly responsible.
The tribunal rejected without argument the theory which
makes the will of the state the only basis for law. All legal
structures on which the court rests have a foundation in
custom. All the treaties which it retains as sources of international law are so, less because they are treaties than
because they are precedents indicating progress, at first uncertain and obscure, then manifest, of a searching by human
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minds which leads to the clarification of a principle of law.
For example, after a long historical study, the court concluded:
The condemnation of a war of aggression as demanded
by world conscience finds its model in the series of pacts
and treaties which have just been cited.

This leads the court on to declare binding for states treaties which they did not sign; this is true if these treaties are
only the codification of custom. Russian soldiers would
benefit from the Hague Conventions, even though Russia
had no formal part in their ratification, for their content, as
certain high German officers recognized, is customary. These
same Conventions were applied to the present war in spite
of a clause expressly stating that they would govern no conflict all of whose belligerents had not ratified the provisions.
It is useless to add examples. The basic position is the
essential point. Let us remark only that it was made almost
inevitable by the declaration of the individual international
responsibility of the Reich leaders. Recognition of this fact
was the main object of the trial; provisions of the London
agreement made clear moreover that the rules of diplomatic
immunity would not protect the leaders of the German state,
and that in no case would orders from a superior excuse
from responsibility, but would at the most be an extenuating
circumstance. Thus at the outset in its most characteristic
consequences the conception of law built on the sovereign
will of the state was rejected. The court on these points
strengthened the stand of the code by recognizing in the
principles a customary character superior to and older than
the London Agreement.
Examination of the Accusations
We have now sketched the general legal tenor of the
court's proceedings; it dominates the interpretation of the
three accusations reproduced above. We shall examine them
beginning with those offering least difficulty.
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As far as the war crimes in the strict sense of the term,
that is, crimes in the conduct of war are concerned, they are
essentially established by the Hague Conventions. The
crimes were numerous and legally simple but they were difficult to prove. The accused were important personages in
the government; they had committed none of the crimes
with their own hands; they had provoked or ordered them.
But it is evident that it was sometimes difficult to prove.
Over certain typical crimes, such as the order to execute all
Russian political commissars captured, or the order to shoot
aviators and escaped prisoners, etc., quite heated discussion
developed. The court recognized the existence of this point
in the accusation against nearly all the criminals.
The crimes agaisthumanity presented both more novelty
and more interest. The editors of the code doubtless had in
view acts of destruction carried out against entire groups,
apparently without relationship to the pursuit of the war.
The clearest case is furnished by the anti-semitic persecutions. It was a question of crimes against men as such; they
admitted then that man possessed inviolate and universal
rights. Thus crimes committed against certain Germans in
1934 by the Nazi government, for example, would be crimes
against humanity. If these latter had been defined as such,
the protection of the internationalrights of man would have
been established. This question was debated even before
the war on a theoretical level; a strong intellectual movement fostering this theory is developing today in the U. N.
0. But positive law is far removed from it and the inhumanity of a state permits free action against appellants so
long as the latter do not belong to a protected international
minority. The code itself makes no radical innovations here.
According to Article 6 (previously cited), a crime against
humanity does not fall within the jurisdiction of the court
unless it be tied to another crime, one of aggression or war,
which the court must consider. The tribunal interpreted
this clause strictly, in this way restricting its jurisdiction
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over crimes against humanity. Here again is apparent its
wish to assimilate the clauses of the code to common international law. A crime against humanity, if it must be connected to the war in order to be judged by the tribunal, loses some
of its identity: in fact it will almost always involve a group
protected by the Hague Conventions and therefore will constitute a war crime stricto sensu. In reality all of the accused were considered guilty of this crime except a few like
Admiral Raeder and Hess whose actions had been very
special and their roles more limited. It was the only crime
held against Streicher, condemned to death for his antisemitic inciting, and against von Schirach, condemned to
twenty years in prison for his Austrian activities. On the
other hand all crimes against humanity prior to Septembei
1, 1939 are outside the court's jurisdiction. We shall see in
this connection that the tribunal refuses to condemn the S. A.
organization for the basic reason that all its activity took
place prior to the opening of hostilities and without direct
connection with the war of aggression.
Finally the crime of aggression showed itself to be the
most delicate and the most important. In the words of the
court,
to declare a war of aggression is not merely an international
crime, it is the supreme international crime, differing from
the other war crimes only in the fact that it contains them all.
The tribunal faced two tasks. In order to remain within
the limits of its general principles, it had to prove that a war
of aggression was a crime even before its code so defined it.
Then it had to outline precisely the individual responsibility
incurred in the launching of a war of aggression.
The court issued an analysis of the long series of pacts,
bilateral agreements, and declarations which, in the years
from 1919 to 1939, condemned wars of aggression. In this
group, the Pact of Paris of 1928, called the Kellogg-Briand
Pact, because of its solemnity rather than its technical aspects, holds a special place. Whether it is a question of this
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pact or of the others, all had been laughed out of court by
the strong opposing minds of the period's pact-haters. The
tribunal's judgment recognizeg in all these documents the
evidences of a fundamental requirement of human conscience and modern society. It sees in them formative precedents for custom and it revalidates in this way these legal
pacts.
By affirming the customary and hence universal nature of
the condemnation of wars of aggression the court easily refuted various judicial arguments designed to prove that such
and such a treaty or declaration was not binding on Germany. On the other hand various difficulties persisted. The
practical as well as the theoretical aspects of these treaties
faltered often in the years 1919-1939 over the concrete procedure for determining aggression. But one principle is
definite: not the parties involved but a third shall determine
the legality, and in this trial the court will be that third
party. It declares:
If international law is ever to become a reality, the question of knowing whether an act undertaken on the pretext of
legitimate defense was aggressive or really offensive must be
the object of a proper study and of arbitration.

The court had no difficulty in fact in determining the
aggressor; let us point out merely that the appendix to the
charges listed twenty-six treaties in defiance of which Germany had made war.
IndividualResponsibility in a War of Aggression
But how is individual responsibility in a war of aggression
to be determined? Here is where the most serious confusion
could arise in opinions. The argument of the defense will
illustrate the difficulty: the supreme leader, Hitler, is the
only responsible person. Any other position leads simply
to the collective condemnation of the whole German people.
And there is the very serious problem which weighed so
heavily in the international relations of the years 1919-1939:
the responsibility of a whole nation.
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If one wants a minimum of clearness in the problem, one
has only to establish from the outset a distinction between
moral, civil and penal responsibilities. That the German
people is morally responsible for the war is indubitable. It
repeatedly called Naziism to power; it had read and approved Mein Kampf in which moreover it found the principles by
which it has been moulded since Frederick II. Except for a
very small minority of persecuted people, the Germans rallied to the German foreign policy and its methods. For
this moral responsibility the entire German nation must pay
the consequences; it is normal that Germany be given a
moral re-education, that she be made to furnish long-term
guarantees in one form or another by which the community
of nations has the right to protect itself against her offensive
deeds. This moral responsibility is also the foundation
of civil responsibility; it is just that all the Germans be responsible for war reparations after all have profited from
depredations.
As for penal responsibility, whose penalty
may even be death, it could not according to the concepts
of civilized nations be settled in collective form. It brings
into play elements of intelligence, volition and liberty whose
stage is personal conscience. It is therefore basically individual. Undoubtedly other concepts not monopolized by Naziism would admit the destruction or enslavement or ruin of
entire classes of individuals collectively defined. They are
not amenable to what France, up to now, has considered
civilization. It was no more a question therefore of condemning all Germans to death than it was of determining a
category of Germans, however few, to be condemned automatically. But how was the guilt of aggression to be determined?
Article 6 of the code which we cited was very vague; it
condemned the direction of, preparation of, waging of and,
"participation in a concerted plan or plot for any one of the
preceding deeds."
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Doesn't a German participate in a war of aggression by
belonging to the Nazi Party? Just as a soldier participates
in waging it? Isn't the industrialist who makes shells one of
the authors of the plot?
The court tried to define these vague thoughts- in order to
make them legally usable. In its eyes, the general program
outlined in .lein Kampf is not a plot. To form the latter one
must have a concrete war plan with a criminal goal and "be
close to decision and action." There were in fact "concerted
and successive plans." The acts of aggression were decided
upon in the course of secret conversations each one of which
is a plot; so it is with the famous meetings of November 5,
1937, of May 23, 1939, of August 22, 1939, and of November 23, 1939. All those who took part in these meetings are
guilty of the crime of plotting for aggression: Goering, Ribbentrop, Keitel, Jodl, Rosenberg, von Neurath, Raeder,
Hess. Equally guilty outside the plot are those who participated in the accomplishment of an act of aggression in
high position carrying a minimum of political autonomy,
which made the office holder an advisor of the supreme head.
Funk participated in an exceptionally important manner in
the economic preparation of certain aggressive operations.
Seyss-Inquart was chief administrator of territories conquered by aggression.
This decision bears with it a certain inevitable arbitrariness; a general judicial theory, that of the accessory, would
have permitted an extension of the group of condemned persons. In this light one can question the acquittals of
Fritsche, von Papen and particularly of Schacht. In reality,
although he was partially in disgrace after the adoption of
the four year plan and totally so at the war's end, he had
been the grand master of the rearmament of the Reich. The
court decided that rearmament was not participation in a
plot for aggression. In our estimation it was wrong' be2 The Soviet justices took advantage of the Anglo-Saxon procedure, shown to
them by the American representative, of issuing a dissenting opinion, a particularly
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cause during its labors the disarmament conference quite
clearly proposed to make rearmament a specific case of
aggression under certain conditions.
However that may be, the judicial make-up of the court
reunites the proposals uttered in the 16th century by the
great predecessor Francisco de Vitoria in his De Jure Belli.
He not only proposed the most finished theory of illegal warfare, but concerning the right and duty of examining the legality of a war he laid down principles fundamentally identical with those of the verdict of Niirnberg.3 Thus -is brought
together again a grand tradition which only the deification
of the modern state had tried to interrupt.
Collective Guilt
The safety of the principle of individual penal responsibility was affirmed by the tribunal in relation to another
question, less spectacular than the trial of the big Nazi leaders but perhaps more serious: that of collective organizations. The court was in fact authorized by the terms of its
statute to declare organizations criminal. A single result
followed this declaration: during subsequent trials before
other courts-national, -German, military occupation-this
criminal character could no longer be questioned. This declaration was really extremely serious. What consequences
wouldn't such national legislation attach to membership in
an organization declared criminal? If it were admitted that
this membership brought automatic guilt, ips&facto, collecunfortunate practice in penal matters. The position of the French judges is not
known for they were more respectful of the secrecy of deliberations. But the
acquittals were marked by differences of opinion.
3 Here is the most characteristic passage: "Legislators, the prince, and in
general all those who are admitted into the councils of state, or that of the prince,
whether they be called to them or whether they be free to come of their own
accord, have the obligation and the duty of deliberating the cause of an unjust war.
The lower classes who are not admitted or heard in either the council of state
or the councils of the prince are not obliged to study the causes of the war; but
they are permitted to fight because they have confidence in their leaders.
Nevertheless, there might be such apparent signs and such indications of the
injustice of the war that ignorance would be no excuse for subjects of this
category who took part in it."
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tive guilt was reintroduced. This fear was not a vain one:
the Inter-allied Control Council of Berlin promulgated a law
which punished mere membership in an organization declared criminal by the court, with penalties ranging from
death to the loss of political rights! This law is indeed a
legal monstrosity and constitutes only one of the elements
of lack of cohesion which obtains in the repression of Naziism
in Germany.
The tribunal condemned the automatic element and collective criminality; its power
must be exercised in conformity with admitted legal principles,
one of the most important of which is that of individual guilt,
which excludes collective penalties.
To be criminals, then, the members of groups must have
belonged freely and must have been aware of their criminal
activities. These facts will constantly be the object of individual examination by the courts. In fact the tribunal
condemned the Gestapo, the Sicherheitsdienst, the S. S. and
the corps of leaders of the Nazi Party. Though pronouncing
a severe moral condemnation of German officers, it acquitted
the General Staff and the High Command (OKW), as well
as the cabinet of the Reich, because these groups did not
constitute organizations in the technical sense of the term.
Similarly it did not condemn the S. A. whose activity was
essentially prior to September 1, 1939.
The verdict of the court indicates numerous distinctions,
therefore; the scale of penalties pronounced bears witness to
a marked care for nuances and gradations. Undoubtedly,
certain parts of the judgment can be questioned, but the construction of the whole is solid and attached to the most
ancient and lofty traditions.
Does that mean that the Niirnberg court attains all the
goals which can be asigned to it? That is a political question which must be separated from the preceding discussion
and to which we shall devote a few brief observations.
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II.

THE NURNBERG VERDICT AND TiE FUTURE OF PEACE

The ashes of the chief criminals have been scattered to
the winds and a shameless press was able to print the photograph of the bodies. And so justice is done. Is that all?
A trial of this nature must permit one to maintain the
reasonable hope that the abominable crimes it condemned
will not reappear. To the extent that it is a work of truth,
it must also help in the correction of the guilty parties. Now
if the guilty persons have nearly all been executed, the German people remain, morally guilty. How can one isolate
the facts of this simultaneously exemplary and medicinal
punishment?
In order to do it we must place the Nlirnberg trial first
in the general frame-work of the repression of war crimes,
then in that of international organization, and finally place
it before the facts of German psychology.
In the General Famework of War Crimes
The Nilrnberg verdict is of great importance, certainly,
but it constitutes only the culmination of a vast undertaking
of justice. Other criminals are and will be judged by national military tribunals or by occupation authority courts
organized in each zone. It is impossible to give a figure, but
the criminal organizations condemned at Ntirnberg alone
involve about 700,000 persons. This action of justice
strikes more closely at the German populace than does the
trial of the leaders responsible for the disasters. This repressive operation must be undertaken in a just, uniform and
relatively moderate fashion. We are far from such a procedure, alas! Dissension among the Allies, political reservations, the impenetrability of the eastern zones have so far
raised obstacles to it. The Allies, at Berlin and often in
their own zones, have issued most severe directives-which
are not always applied. Hence a diverging legal procedure,
an unequal and irregular repression. Justice for the "little
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man" is no longer anything but the bearer of a political
attitude in which the eventuality of a future conflict, the
preparation of partisan groups as well as the making of secret weapons, are more important than the law.
In this respect the court formulated "recommendations"
from which the student gleans technical points which have
no place here, but which the French government had adopted
long ago. If German affairs were to remain long what they
are now, the Niirnberg verdict would soon appear as the
fruit of a lofty doctrine certain omissions of which the Allies
sanction strongly, but which is far from presenting the qualities of universality and restraining power which are in its
essence, since the conquerors hold it rather cheaply. It will
be easy for German lawyers to gather inadequate and contradictory judicial decisions and to judge the conqueror in the
light of his own principles.
In the Framework of IntgrnationalOrganization
In a more general way, the Niirnberg court must be placed
in the framework of the evolution of international institutions. Its work in this respect depends essentially on the
future, from which it will receive definitive meaning and interpretation. Will it appear ten years from now as one of
the vital links in the long chain of achievements which leads
to the organization of an international community? Or will
it be an effort with no consequences? In this last case, it
would lose even the just and impartial character which it
presents today to all observers of good faith. It would appear as the work of an idealism not only vain but interested,
imposed on the conquered by the conquerors in order to
gratify their passions or to serve their interests. It is tragic
to think that even today, in spite of the enormity of the
crimes which it condemns, this judgment cannot yet have
indisputable authority. If, on the contrary, the efforts of
governments progress unceasingly in spite of obstacles and
checks, if humanity achieves its destiny, then the significance
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of this trial will be complete, and it will be so much more
willingly forgotten that not all the conquerors were above
reproach.
Analogous to these thoughts are those which the great
journalist, Walter Lippmann, proposed to the American public; they are those of enlightened Germans of good faith.
One cannot see in them, however, the expression of German
public opinion.
In the Light of German Psychology
It must first be admitted that most Germans are awaking
from a dark and terrible dream and are wholly absorbed in
material difficulties and the struggle to keep from dying of
hunger. The Berlin demonstrations against the acquittals
are an example of a political minority acting toward exact
goals. The majority of the Germans are not at this time convinced in any way of the existence of the crimes established
by the Niirnberg trial, except perhaps of the horrors of
concentration camps. Still they do not speak out too loudly
against the punishments in which they see the exercise of
a conqueror's natural rights rather than an expression of
justice.
Nevertheless a few apparently general reactions may be
noted. Goering's swaggering and the courageous assurance
with which he underwent the trial won even more sympathy
for him from his compatriots since he had lost favor in the
last years of the Nazi regime. The average German moreover feels himself quite a part of the Wehrmacht; he accepts
nothing which might taint the honor of the Army; the condemnation of Keitel and Jodl, their behavior at the scaffold,
the degrading death inflicted upon them, all these made vivid
impressions upon German public opinion. When Field Marshal von Paulus was called as a witness at Niirnberg, his
meeting with his fellow citizens allowed the defense to seize
a moral advantage, for its clients were innocent of one crime
at least-treason. That was the immediate impression of
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several members of the public administration not suspected
of being favorable to the German cause. One cannot expect
the Germans accustomed for centuries to passive obedience
to established powers to raise themselves at once to the level
of the eminently lofty civilization of the Niirnberg trial.
In our opinion there is no doubt but that at the moment
this trial has a negative effect on German opinion. In order
for it to assist in the future in a benevolent re-education of
Germany, German politics and international organization
must develop profoundly from now on in the direction we
indicated above. But that will still not suffice. When we
speak of German opinion, we always forget a capital fact,
that in peoples as in individuals there exists a vast section
of psychic life which is unconscious, in which may occur
wounds and in which psychoses may develop. In the German, this collective unconsciousness is highly developed and
terribly bruised. It is no mere chance that the most vital
formulae of psychoanalysis appeared in German studies.
Perhaps it is in this light that we can find an answer to a
question which occurred to us while we looked at this remarkable gang embarked on its last adventure in the courtroom in Niirnberg. Neon tubes shed an artificial light so
well diffused that it looked like daylight; the enameled
white helmets of the military police, among which the green
helmet of Colonel Andrus introduced a pastoral note, held
the eye at first; only later did one catch an over-all glimpse
of that group of men, somewhat pale, already collected behind solemn and frank M. P.'s, like dead leaves behind the
fences of a park in autumn. These faces and attitudes were
so ordinary and easy to identify in any German group that
they might have climbed down from a third class compartment of a German train chosen at random. This observation is frightening, for it seems on one hand that Germany
may indefinitely give rebirth to a group of this kind, and
on the other hand we wonder how this compliant German
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which they represent so well, could have committed these
monstrous crimes.
In our opinion the cause must in part be sought in these
psychoses whose cure we must hasten and whose renewal
we must prevent. The actions of the great nations toward
Germany should also take into consideration the conditions
of the German psychology. This is not the place to sketch
these problems. But the German mind is fearfully oppressed
by an inferiority complex, and it is known that cruelty nearly always has its origin in fear. But why does Germany feel
herself inferior and why is she afraid? These questions
should be attacked from a medical point of view. They determine an important aspect of the re-education of Germany
and of her real liberation.
Why must it be that the simple announcement of these
problems appears today almost peculiar, if not laughable?
In the stadium of Niirnberg one feels perhaps better the
vast danger which threatens us. Peaceful tennis players and
carefree sport enthusiasts play there where legions used to
mill, eager to set out on the conquest of the world. The
seats are empty and part of the mob which howled there now
lies under the rubble of destroyed cities. The magnificent
stone monument is but a witness to the weakness of empires.
Merely by the strength of its simple architecture it accuses
the silence and emptiness. Will the civilization which conquered barbarity be able to people this solitude? Will it
have the youth and confident energy which will unite nations
in enthusiasm for the triumphs of peace?
Paul Reuter.
Tranlatedfrom the French by Robert D. Nuner

